At PKC 2009, May and Ritzenhofen proposed the implicit factorization problem (IFP). They showed that it is undemanding to factor two h-bit RSA moduli N1=p1q1, N2=p2q2 where q1, q2 are both αh-bit, and p1, p2 share uh>2αh the least significant bits (LSBs). Subsequent works mainly focused on extending the IFP to the cases where p1, p2 share some of the most significant bits (MSBs) or the middle bits (MBs). In this paper, we propose a novel generalized IFP where p1 and p2 share an arbitrary number of bit blocks, with each block having a consistent displacement in its position between p1 and p2, and we solve it successfully based on Coppersmith’s method. Specifically, we generate a new set of shift polynomials to construct the lattice and optimize the structure of the lattice by introducing a new variable z=p1. We derive that we can factor the two moduli in polynomial time when u>2(n+1)α(1−α^1/(n+1)) with p1, p2 sharing n blocks. Further, no matter how many blocks are shared, we can theoretically factor the two moduli as long as u>2αln(1/α). In addition, we consider two other cases where the positions of the shared blocks are arbitrary or there are k>2 known moduli. Meanwhile, we provide the corresponding solutions for the two cases. Our work is verified by experiments.

Let (N,e) be a public key of the RSA cryptosystem, and d be the corresponding private key. In practice, we usually choose a small e for quick encryption. In this paper, we improve partial private key exposure attacks against RSA with a small public exponent e. The key idea is that under such a setting we can usually obtain more information about the prime factor of N and then by solving a univariate modular polynomial with Coppersmith's method, N can be factored in polynomial time. Compared to previous results, we reduce the number of d's leaked bits needed to mount the attack by log_2 (e) bits. Furthermore, our experiments show that for 1024-bit N, our attack can achieve the theoretical bound on a personal computer, which verified our attack.

This paper presents software implementations of batch computations, dealing with multi-precision integer operations. In this work, we use the Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) AVX512 instruction set of the x86-64 processors, in particular the vectorized fused multiplier-adder VPMADD52. We focus on batch multiplications, squarings, modular multiplications, modular squarings and constant time modular exponentiations of 8 values using a word-slicing storage. We explore the use of Schoolbook and Karatsuba approaches with operands up to 4108 and 4154 bits respectively. We also introduce a truncated multiplication that speeds up the computation of the Montgomery modular reduction in the context of software implementation. Our Truncated Montgomery modular multiplication improvement offers speed gains of almost 20 % over the conventional non-truncated versions. Compared to the state-of-the-art GMP and OpenSSL libraries, our speedup modular operations are more than 4 times faster. Compared to OpenSSL BN_mod_exp_mont_consttimex2 using AVX512 and madd52* (madd52hi or madd52lo) in 256-bit registers, in fixed-window exponentiations of sizes $1024$ and $2048$, our 512-bit implementation provides speedups of respectively 1.75 and 1.38, while the 256-bit version speedups are 1.51 and 1.05 for $1024$ and $2048$-bit sizes (batch of 4 values in this case).

Watermarking pseudorandom functions (PRF) allow an authority to embed an unforgeable and unremovable watermark into a PRF while preserving its functionality. In this work, we extend the work of Kim and Wu [Crypto'19] who gave a simple two-step construction of watermarking PRFs from a class of extractable PRFs satisfying several other properties – first construct a mark-embedding scheme, and then upgrade it to a message-embedding scheme.

While the message-embedding scheme of Kim and Wu is based on complex homomorphic evaluation techniques, we observe that much simpler constructions can be obtained and from a wider range of assumptions, if we forego the strong requirement of security against the watermarking authority. Concretely, we introduce a new notion called extractable PRGs (xPRGs), from which extractable PRFs (without security against authorities) suitable for the Kim-Wu transformations can be simply obtained via the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali (GGM) construction. We provide simple constructions of xPRGs from a wide range of assumptions such as hardness of computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) in the random oracle model, as well as LWE and RSA in the standard model.

To be useful and widely accepted, automated contact tracing schemes (also called exposure notification) need to solve two seemingly contradictory problems at the same time: they need to protect the anonymity of honest users while also preventing malicious users from creating false alarms. In this paper, we provide, for the first time, an exposure notification construction that guarantees the same levels of privacy and integrity as existing schemes but with a fully malicious database (notably similar to Auerbach et al. CT-RSA 2021) without special restrictions on the adversary. We construct a new definition so that we can formally prove our construction secure. Our definition ensures the following integrity guarantees: no malicious user can cause exposure warnings in two locations at the same time and that any uploaded exposure notifications must be recent and not previously uploaded. Our construction is efficient, requiring only a single message to be broadcast at contact time no matter how many recipients are nearby. To notify contacts of potential infection, an infected user uploads data with size linear in the number of notifications, similar to other schemes. Linear upload complexity is not trivial with our assumptions and guarantees (a naive scheme would be quadratic). This linear complexity is achieved with a new primitive: zero knowledge subset proofs over commitments which is used by our "no cloning" proof protocol. We also introduce another new primitive: set commitments on equivalence classes, which makes each step of our construction more efficient. Both of these new primitives are of independent interest.

Side-channel attacks targeting cryptography may leak only partial or indirect information about the secret keys. There are a variety of techniques in the literature for recovering secret keys from partial information. In this work, we survey several of the main families of partial key recovery algorithms for RSA, (EC)DSA, and (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman, the classical public-key cryptosystems in common use today. We categorize the known techniques by the structure of the information that is learned by the attacker, and give simplified examples for each technique to illustrate the underlying ideas.