On the Efficiency of Generic, Quantum Cryptographic Constructions
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Abstract
One of the central questions in cryptology is how efficient generic constructions of cryptographic primitives can be. Gennaro, Gertner, Katz, and Trevisan [SIAM J. of Compt., 2005] studied the lower bounds of the number of invocations of a (trapdoor) one-way permutation in order to construct cryptographic schemes, e.g., pseudorandom number generators, digital signatures, and public-key and symmetric-key encryption.
Recently, quantum machines have been explored to _construct_ cryptographic primitives other than quantum key distribution. This paper studies the efficiency of _quantum_ black-box constructions of cryptographic primitives when the communications are _classical_. Following Gennaro et al., we give the lower bounds of the number of invocations of an underlying quantumly-computable quantum-one-way permutation when the _quantum_ construction of pseudorandom number generator and symmetric-key encryption is weakly black-box. Our results show that the quantum black-box constructions of pseudorandom number generator and symmetric-key encryption do not improve the number of invocations of an underlying quantumly-computable quantum-one-way permutation.
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How to cite
Keita Xagawa, "On the Efficiency of Generic, Quantum Cryptographic Constructions," IACR Communications in Cryptology, vol. 1, no. 1, Apr 09, 2024, doi: 10.62056/a66c0l5vt.
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