Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of GIFT family and GIFT-based Ciphers
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Abstract
At CHES 2017, Banik et al. proposed a lightweight block cipher GIFT consisting of two versions GIFT-64 and GIFT-128. Recently, there are lots of authenticated encryption schemes that adopt GIFT-128 as their underlying primitive, such as GIFT-COFB and HyENA. To promote a comprehensive perception of the soundness of the designs, we evaluate their security against differential-linear cryptanalysis.
For this, automatic tools have been developed to search differential-linear approximation for the ciphers based on S-boxes. With the assistance of the automatic tools, we find 13-round differential-linear approximations for GIFT-COFB and HyENA. Based on the distinguishers, 18-round key-recovery attacks are given for the message processing phase and initialization phase of both ciphers. Moreover, the resistance of GIFT-64/128 against differential-linear cryptanalysis is also evaluated. The 12-round and 17-round differential-linear approximations are found for GIFT-64 and GIFT-128 respectively, which lead to 18-round and 19-round key-recovery attacks respectively. Here, we stress that our attacks do not threaten the security of these ciphers.
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How to cite
Shichang Wang, Meicheng Liu, Shiqi Hou, and Dongdai Lin, Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of GIFT family and GIFT-based Ciphers. IACR Communications in Cryptology, vol. 1, no. 1, Apr 09, 2024, doi: 10.62056/a6n5txol7.
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