Communications in Cryptology IACR CiC

Bit Security as Cost to Demonstrate Advantage

Authors

Keewoo Lee
Keewoo Lee
UC Berkeley, USA
keewoo dot lee at berkeley dot edu
Keywords: bit security security definition Hellinger distance

Abstract

We revisit the question of what the definition of bit security should be, previously answered by Micciancio-Walter (Eurocrypt 2018) and Watanabe-Yasunaga (Asiacrypt 2021). Our new definition is simple, but (i) captures both search and decision primitives in a single framework like Micciancio-Walter, and (ii) has a firm operational meaning like Watanabe-Yasunaga. It also matches intuitive expectations and can be well-formulated regarding Hellinger distance. To support and justify the new definition, we prove several classic security reductions with respect to our bit security. We also provide pathological examples that indicate the ill-definedness of bit security defined in Micciancio-Walter and Watanabe-Yasunaga.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.62056/an5txol7
History
Submitted: 2023-12-29
Accepted: 2024-03-05
Published: 2024-04-09
How to cite

Keewoo Lee, Bit Security as Cost to Demonstrate Advantage. IACR Communications in Cryptology, vol. 1, no. 1, Apr 09, 2024, doi: 10.62056/an5txol7.

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