Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) allow a client to evaluate a pseudorandom function (PRF) on her secret input based on a key that is held by a server. In the process, the client only learns the PRF output but not the key, while the server neither learns the input nor the output of the client. The arguably most popular OPRF is due to Naor, Pinkas and Reingold (Eurocrypt 2009). It is based on an Oblivious Exponentiation by the server, with passive security under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this work, we strengthen the security guarantees of the NPR OPRF by protecting it against active attacks of the server. We have implemented our solution and report on the performance. Our main result is a new batch OPRF protocol which is secure against maliciously corrupted servers, but is essentially as efficient as the semi-honest solution. More precisely, the computation (and communication) overhead is a multiplicative factor $o(1)$ as the batch size increases. The obvious solution using zero-knowledge proofs would have a constant factor overhead at best, which can be too expensive for certain deployments. Our protocol relies on a novel version of the DDH problem, which we call the Oblivious Exponentiation Problem (OEP), and we give evidence for its hardness in the Generic Group model. We also present a variant of our maliciously secure protocol that does not rely on the OEP but nevertheless only has overhead $o(1)$ over the known semi-honest protocol. Moreover, we show that our techniques can also be used to efficiently protect threshold blind BLS signing and threshold ElGamal decryption against malicious attackers.

This paper presents software implementations of batch computations, dealing with multi-precision integer operations. In this work, we use the Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) AVX512 instruction set of the x86-64 processors, in particular the vectorized fused multiplier-adder VPMADD52. We focus on batch multiplications, squarings, modular multiplications, modular squarings and constant time modular exponentiations of 8 values using a word-slicing storage. We explore the use of Schoolbook and Karatsuba approaches with operands up to 4108 and 4154 bits respectively. We also introduce a truncated multiplication that speeds up the computation of the Montgomery modular reduction in the context of software implementation. Our Truncated Montgomery modular multiplication improvement offers speed gains of almost 20 % over the conventional non-truncated versions. Compared to the state-of-the-art GMP and OpenSSL libraries, our speedup modular operations are more than 4 times faster. Compared to OpenSSL BN_mod_exp_mont_consttimex2 using AVX512 and madd52* (madd52hi or madd52lo) in 256-bit registers, in fixed-window exponentiations of sizes $1024$ and $2048$, our 512-bit implementation provides speedups of respectively 1.75 and 1.38, while the 256-bit version speedups are 1.51 and 1.05 for $1024$ and $2048$-bit sizes (batch of 4 values in this case).