



Boomy: Batch Opening Of Multivariate polynomial commitment

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Abstract. We present Boomy, a multivariate polynomial commitment scheme enabling the proof of the evaluation of multiple points, i.e., batch opening. Boomy is the natural extension of two popular protocols: the univariate polynomial commitment scheme of Kate, Zaverucha and Goldberg [KZG10] and its multivariate counterpart from Papamanthou, Shi and Tamassia [PST13]. Our construction is proven secure under the selective security model. In this paper, we present Boomy’s complexity and the applications on which it can have a significant impact. In fact, Boomy is perfectly suited to tackling blockchain problems by greatly improving data availability sampling and shrinking existing challenges. We also present special lower-complexity cases that occur frequently in practical situations.

1 Introduction

Polynomial commitment schemes, whether univariate or multivariate, are a key component in modern cryptography. They allow a prover to convince a verifier (with overwhelming probability) that a polynomial of bounded degree evaluates at a given value or a given point, and this without revealing the polynomial itself. To do that, the prover engages their polynomial through a commitment. They can later generate a proof of one or several evaluations of the same polynomial. Given the proof and the commitment, the verifier is then able to enforce the correct evaluation of the committed polynomial.

Polynomial commitment schemes must satisfy several key properties to ensure their security and usability:

1. **Correctness:** A commitment scheme is correct if, for any polynomial committed by an honest prover, the verification algorithm accepts the proof generated by the honest prover with overwhelming probability.
2. **Polynomial Binding:** The binding property ensures that a prover cannot change the committed polynomial after the commitment phase. This means that once a commitment is made, the prover is bound to the polynomial and cannot produce a valid proof for a different polynomial using the same commitment.
3. **Evaluation Binding:** This property ensures that the prover cannot produce a valid proof for an incorrect evaluation of the polynomial. In other words, the prover is bound to the correct evaluations of the committed polynomial.
4. **Computational Hiding:** The hiding property ensures that the commitment does not reveal any information about the polynomial itself. This is crucial for maintaining the privacy of the polynomial while still allowing for verification of its evaluations.

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Univariate polynomial commitment protocols are used rather regularly for their simplicity and performance. They are relatively easy to set up and often offer better computation and communication complexities than their multivariate counterparts. However, univariate polynomial commitment schemes are flexibility-limited: they cannot efficiently represent certain complex data types or mathematical relationships. Multivariate polynomial commitments are the answer to this shortcoming of univariate protocols.

Polynomial commitment schemes are beneficial to many applications such as building zero-knowledge protocols [Dam98], secret sharing [KZG10] or confidential cryptographic transactions [HBHW16].

One notable application of polynomial commitment schemes is in the construction of SNARKs (Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge). SNARKs allow a prover to demonstrate the validity of a statement without revealing any information beyond the truth of the statement. They are characterized by several key properties forming their name:

- **Succinct:** Communications are tiny compared to the length of the computation. The verifier complexity is in $O(\log n)$, with n being the witness' size.
- **Non-Interactive:** There are little to no interactions (no rounds of interactions) between the prover and the verifier, often just a setup phase and a small message from the prover to the verifier.
- **Argument:** An argument is a type of proof where the verifier is only protected against a computationally limited prover. This means that with unlimited resources it is possible to forge a false argument. However, this is statistically impossible for a PPT adversary. This is called computational soundness, as opposed to perfect soundness. Perfect soundness, which is reserved for proofs, means that the protocol is resistant to any kind of adversary and it is impossible to forge invalid proofs. In other words, the security of an argument system relies on computational assumptions. That means, given sufficient computational resources, a malicious prover could potentially convince the verifier of a false statement. As opposed, a proof is a stronger notion where the verifier is convinced of the validity of a statement with absolute certainty, without relying on computational assumptions. In this document, we will often use the term proof instead of argument even if it is not resistant to every kind of opponent.
- **of Knowledge:** A prover cannot construct a proof or an argument without knowing the witness. Formally, for any prover who can produce a valid argument, there exists an extractor able to extract a witness from the statement. Informally, the prover cannot create a proof or argument of a statement, even if it is true, without knowing the underlying reason. This property is also called knowledge-soundness.

Our contribution, the Boomy protocol, extends the capabilities of polynomial commitment schemes to multivariate polynomials and batch openings. This advancement can lead to improvement in specific cases for applications like verifiable computation and data availability sampling, where efficient and secure verification of complex computations is essential.

1.1 Related Works and Contribution

The first polynomial commitment scheme proposed in 2010 [KZG10], allowed a prover to convince a verifier of the evaluation of a committed univariate polynomial at one or more points. Later, [PST13] built on this work, introducing multivariate polynomials but for single point openings, forging fresh avenues for new verifiable computation schemes.




Figure 1: Boomy’s positioning relative to other works.

Boomy is the natural continuation of these schemes, generalizing multivariate polynomial commitments to a batch of evaluation points as presented below in Figure 1.

Since 2013, other works have suggested multivariate polynomial commitments in different security models and with different cryptographic assumptions. We followed the same approach as in [KZG10] and based Boomy on pairing-friendly groups. Other works have proposed schemes in the random oracle model [Lee21] or based on the discrete logarithm problem [BBB⁺18]. This enables protocols of multivariate polynomial commitments that either support proof using a transparent setup like [Lee21] and [BBB⁺18] or do not require any setup [XZS22]. This last article is potentially post-quantum since it is only based on hash functions. All of these improvements are made to the detriment of the proof size and/or the opening and verification complexities. Even though it is not post-quantum, Boomy has either better complexity or better compatibility: for instance, the work of [Lee21] is a very good candidate for SNARKs for its efficiency but is limited to multilinear polynomials (of degree at most one in each variable).

Multivariate polynomial commitments have proven to be of genuine interest to the field of verifiable computation. Using the results of [PST13], the authors of [CHM⁺20] introduced one of the first universal Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (universal SNARK or SNORK) based on multivariate polynomial commitments in parallel with [GWC19] which uses univariate polynomials. Recently, [CBBZ23] proposed a new version of [XZS22] based on pairing-friendly fields that can only commit multi-linear polynomials but accelerates the work presented in [GWC19].

In this paper we propose a multivariate polynomial commitment supporting batch opening, which is defined in [KZG10] as the opening of several evaluation points at once. We based our technique on [PST13] by extending and generalizing their scheme using the Gröbner bases theory. This new approach also allows the description and interpretation of their scheme from new perspectives. We study the complexity of this scheme, which we have called Boomy, both in the general case and in the special case where points are all distinct in at least one dimension. Both complexities are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Complexity of the Boomy protocol for k openings of a multivariate polynomial in $\mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ of degree bounded by d_i in each variable X_i . d denotes the maximum number of terms in the polynomial: $d := \prod_{i=1}^n d_i$. Lines commit, opening and verification present the complexity of their computations, with \mathbb{G}_i^+ and \mathbb{G}_i^\times respectively denoting addition and scalar multiplication in \mathbb{G}_i , \mathbb{F}^\times denoting multiplications in \mathbb{F} , \mathcal{P} denoting the pairing operation, $|\mathbf{B}|$ the size of the Gröbner basis, $\|P\|$ and $\|R\|$ being respectively the product of the maximum coefficients in each variable of the polynomial and of the remainder of the division. These notations are detailed in Section 2.

	general case	special case
pk size	$d\mathbb{G}_1$	$d\mathbb{G}_1$
vk size	$(k^n)\mathbb{G}_1, (k^n)\mathbb{G}_2$	$k\mathbb{G}_1, (k+n)\mathbb{G}_2$
proof size	$ \mathbf{B} \mathbb{G}_1$	$n\mathbb{G}_1$
commit size	$1\mathbb{G}_1$	$1\mathbb{G}_1$
commit	$(d-1)\mathbb{G}_1^+, d\mathbb{G}_1^\times$	$(d-1)\mathbb{G}_1^+, d\mathbb{G}_1^\times$
opening	$\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} d \log d \log \ P\ + nk^3)\mathbb{F}^\times,$ $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} \cdot d)\mathbb{G}_1^+,$ $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} \cdot d)\mathbb{G}_1^\times$	$\mathcal{O}(nk \log k +$ $nd \log d \log \ P\)\mathbb{F}^\times,$ $\mathcal{O}(nd)\mathbb{G}_1^+, \mathcal{O}(nd)\mathbb{G}_1^\times$
verification	$\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} d \log d \log \ R\ + nk^3)\mathbb{F}^\times,$ $\mathcal{O}(k^n)\mathbb{G}_1^+, \mathcal{O}(k^n)\mathbb{G}_1^\times,$ $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} \cdot k^n)\mathbb{G}_2^+,$ $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} \cdot k^n)\mathbb{G}_2^\times, (\mathbf{B} +1)\mathcal{P}$	$\mathcal{O}(nk \log k)\mathbb{F}^\times,$ $k\mathbb{G}_1^+, (k+1)\mathbb{G}_1^\times,$ $\mathcal{O}(nk)\mathbb{G}_2^+,$ $\mathcal{O}(nk)\mathbb{G}_2^\times, (n+1)\mathcal{P}$

We note that the complexity of Boomy is better than the complexity consisting of doing k openings with the protocol in [PST13] and aggregating them using a uniformly random linear combination as in [BDFG20]. To our knowledge, Boomy is the first proposal of a protocol allowing the batch opening of a multivariate polynomial based on pairing-friendly groups, paving the way for new applications in the field of verifiable computation.

While the Boomy protocol extends the capabilities of polynomial commitment schemes to multivariate polynomials and batch openings, it also has several limitations:

- **Complexity:** The complexity of the Boomy protocol, especially in the general case, can be significantly higher than that of univariate schemes. This is due to the increased complexity of handling multivariate polynomials and the need to compute Gröbner bases.
- **Post-Quantum Security:** Boomy is not post-quantum secure. Advancements in quantum computing could potentially compromise the security of the protocol.
- **Trusted Setup:** The protocol requires a trusted setup phase, where certain parameters are generated and distributed. This setup phase can be a point of failure or a target for attacks. However, the trusted setup can be built using a multi-party computation protocol with the ceremony of the powers of tau, enhancing its security.

We first introduce preliminaries in Section 2 and present the intuition, the construction, the proof of security and the complexity of Boomy in Section 3. We then analyze special cases in Section 4. In Section 5, we explore the potential impact Boomy can have on different applications like verifiable computation or proof of data availability.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notations

Throughout this paper, λ will denote the security parameter, \mathbb{F} a finite field of super-polynomial size $\lambda^{\omega(1)}$ and $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T)$ groups of the same size $\lambda^{\omega(1)}$ that allow the construction of a non-degenerate pairing function $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ computable in polynomial time over λ . $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_T will be written additively.

It will be implicitly assumed that before all else, an algorithm is executed to output $(\mathbb{F}, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, G_1, G_2, G_T)$ given λ as input, such that G_1 and G_2 are uniformly randomly chosen generators of \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 respectively, with $e(G_1, G_2) = G_T$ a generator of \mathbb{G}_T .

These generated parameters are also implicitly given as inputs for every algorithm. All adversaries will be supposed probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms. $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ will denote the set of all negligible functions over λ , i.e., all functions lower than $1/p(\lambda)$ for all polynomials p evaluated in λ .

Finally, we will abbreviate vectors with bold letters (e.g., $\mathbf{X} := [X_1, \dots, X_n]$), the cardinality of a set using the absolute value symbols, elements of the group $\mathbb{G}_i : i \in \{1, 2, T\}$ by using $[\alpha]_i = \alpha \cdot G_i$ and will often write the non-zero integer-set up to n as $[n] := \{1, \dots, n\}$. We will also use bold notation for ideals \mathbf{I} and algebraic affine varieties \mathbf{V} .

Table 2: Notations used in the paper

Notation	Description
λ	Security parameter
\mathbb{F}	Finite field of super-polynomial size $\lambda^{\omega(1)}$
$(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T)$	Groups of the same size $\lambda^{\omega(1)}$ that allow the construction of a non-degenerate pairing function e
$e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$	Pairing function computable in polynomial time over λ
G_1, G_2, G_T	Generators of $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$, and \mathbb{G}_T respectively
$[\alpha]_i$	Element $\alpha \cdot G_i$ in group G_i
\mathbf{X}	Vector of variables $[X_1, \dots, X_n]$
$ \cdot $	Cardinality of a set
\mathbf{I}	Ideal in a polynomial ring
$\mathbf{V}(f_1, \dots, f_s)$	Affine variety defined by polynomials f_1, \dots, f_s
$\mathbf{I}(\mathbf{V})$	Ideal of polynomials that vanish on the variety \mathbf{V}
$LT(f)$	Leading term of the polynomial f
\mathbf{B}	Gröbner basis of an ideal
cm	Commitment of a polynomial
π	Proof of the evaluation of a polynomial
vk	Verifier key
pk	Prover key

2.2 Algebraic Geometry

In this Section, we present a few properties of algebraic geometry that will be useful throughout the rest of this article. We refer the reader to [CLOS94] for a more detailed introduction and more details or proofs on monomial ordering, Gröbner bases and algebraic affine varieties.

Definition 1. For any field \mathbb{F} and a set of polynomials $f_1, \dots, f_s \in \mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}]$, $\mathbf{V}(f_1, \dots, f_s) = \{\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^n \mid f_i(\mathbf{a}) = 0 \text{ for all } 1 \leq i \leq s\}$ is an affine variety. It can either be defined from the polynomials f_1, \dots, f_s (or the ideal that they generate) or directly from the zeros.

Definition 2. The ideal $I(\mathbf{V})$ of an affine variety \mathbf{V} is the Ideal of $\mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}]$ that includes all polynomials that vanish on \mathbf{V} .

Note that if \mathbb{F} is not an algebraically closed field, for $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{V}(f_1, \dots, f_s)$, it is possible that $\langle f_1, \dots, f_s \rangle \subsetneq I(\mathbf{V})$.

Definition 3. From [FG06], for $f_1, \dots, f_m \in \mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ in a vanishing polynomial ideal $I(\mathbf{V}) = \{\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_k\}$, f_1, \dots, f_m is a Gröbner basis of I if and only if

$$\left| \left\{ \mathbf{X}^\alpha := \prod_{i=1}^n X_i^{\alpha_i} : \alpha_i \in \mathbb{N} \text{ and } LT(f_j) \nmid \mathbf{X}^\alpha, 1 \leq j \leq m \right\} \right| = k$$

Where LT denotes the leading term of the polynomial, i.e., the term with the highest power of the highest monomial (according to the chosen monomial ordering) of this polynomial.

Definition 4. Given a monomial ordering $<$, and a Gröbner basis $\mathbf{B} = \{f_1, \dots, f_s\}$ of an ideal $I \subseteq \mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$, for any $P \in \mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}]$ there is a unique $R \in \mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}]$ such that:

- no term of R is divisible by any leading term of f_i , $1 \leq i \leq m$
- $\exists G \in I$ such that $P = G + R$

Following this definition, R is the unique remainder that is the result of the division of P by \mathbf{B} independently of the order of the polynomials in the division.

Definition 5. A Gröbner basis \mathbf{B} is reduced if and only if, for all elements P of \mathbf{B} , their leading coefficient is 1 and they are irreducible by the other elements, i.e., all their monomials are not in the ideal $\langle LT(\mathbf{B} \setminus \{P\}) \rangle$. Any non-empty polynomial ideal has a unique reduced Gröbner basis.

2.3 Cryptographic Assumptions

Boomy's security, like [PST13], relies on the discrete logarithm (DL), the l-Diffie-Hellman (l-DL) and the l-Strong Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (l-SBDH) [GMC07] assumptions.

Definition 6. DL Assumption. For any $\tau \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}^*$. Given the tuple $([1]_1, [\tau]_1) \in \mathbb{G}_1^2$ and for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , $\Pr[\mathcal{A}([1]_1, [\tau]_1) = \tau] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Definition 7. l-DL Assumption. For any $\tau \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}^*$. Given the tuple $([1]_1, [\tau]_1, \dots, [\tau^l]_1) \in \mathbb{G}_1^{l+1}$ and for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , $\Pr[\mathcal{A}([1]_1, [\tau]_1, \dots, [\tau^l]_1) = \tau] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Definition 8. l-SBDH Assumption. For any $\tau \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}^*$. Given the tuple $([1]_1, [\tau]_1, \dots, [\tau^l]_1) \in \mathbb{G}_1^{l+1}$ and for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , $\Pr[\mathcal{A}([1]_1, [\tau]_1, \dots, [\tau^l]_1) = (c, [\frac{1}{\tau+c}]_T)] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for any $c \in \mathbb{F} \setminus \{-\tau\}$.

2.4 Multivariate Polynomial Commitment for Multiple Points

We define a multivariate polynomial commitment for multiple points (MPC_MP) as a scheme which follows our extension of the definition given by [KZG10]. More precisely, we expand their definition to several variables and on a batch of evaluation points.

Definition 9. A MPC_MP consists of four algorithms: Setup, Commit, Open and Verify such that:

- **Setup**(\mathbf{d}, k): generates a verifier key vk and a prover key pk . The prover key can be used to commit, or to open on a set containing at most k evaluation points, a multivariate polynomial of degree at most d_i in variable X_i . The verifier key is used in the verification of an opening generated with pk .
- **Commit**(P, pk): deterministically generates a polynomial commitment cm of the polynomial P using the prover key pk .
- **Open**($P, k, (\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}, pk$): generates the proof π of the evaluation of $P \in \mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ at the k points $(\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}$ using pk (with $\mathbf{a}_i = [a_{i,1}, \dots, a_{i,n}]$).
- **Verify**($k, (\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}, \mathbf{z}, \pi, cm, vk$): verifies that indeed $\forall i \in [k], z_i = P(\mathbf{a}_i)$, i.e., \mathbf{z} are the correct evaluations of the polynomial P at (\mathbf{a}_i) , P being represented indirectly by its commitment cm . It outputs *accept* if it holds and *reject* otherwise.

Definition 10. A MPC_MP scheme is considered secure if these four properties (correctness, polynomial binding, evaluation binding and hiding) hold:

- **Correctness:** For all $P \in \mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}]$ of degree at most d_i in variable X_i , and for all $(\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]} \in (\mathbb{F}^n)^k$:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (pk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\mathbf{d}, k) \\ cm \leftarrow \text{Commit}(P, pk) \\ \pi \leftarrow \text{Open}(P, k, (\mathbf{a}_i), pk) \end{array} : \text{Verify}(k, (\mathbf{a}_i), (P(\mathbf{a}_i)), \pi, cm, vk) = \text{Accept} \right] = 1$$

- **Polynomial Binding:** For all PPT adversary \mathcal{A} :

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (pk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\mathbf{d}, k), (cm, P(\mathbf{X}), P'(\mathbf{X})) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk) : \\ \text{Commit}(P(\mathbf{X}), pk) = cm \wedge \\ \text{Commit}(P'(\mathbf{X}), pk) = cm \wedge \\ P(\mathbf{X}) \neq P'(\mathbf{X}) \end{array} \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

- **Evaluation Binding:** For all PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it is selectively secure if:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\mathbf{a}_i) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(), (pk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\mathbf{d}, k), (cm, \mathbf{z}, \pi, \mathbf{z}', \pi') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk) : \\ \text{Verify}(k, (\mathbf{a}_i), \mathbf{z}, \pi, cm, vk) = \text{Accept} \wedge \\ \text{Verify}(k, (\mathbf{a}_i), \mathbf{z}', \pi', cm, vk) = \text{Accept} \wedge \\ \exists i \in [k] : z_i \neq z'_i \end{array} \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

else it is adaptively secure if:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (pk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\mathbf{d}, k), (cm, (\mathbf{a}_i), \mathbf{z}, \pi, \mathbf{z}', \pi') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk) : \\ \text{Verify}(k, (\mathbf{a}_i), \mathbf{z}, \pi, cm, vk) = \text{Accept} \wedge \\ \text{Verify}(k, (\mathbf{a}_i), \mathbf{z}', \pi', cm, vk) = \text{Accept} \wedge \\ \exists i \in [k] : z_i \neq z'_i \end{array} \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

- **Computational Hiding:** For all polynomial $P \in \mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}]$, given at most $d := (\prod_i d_i) - 1$ proven evaluation points distributed over one or more batches, a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} cannot determine the value of a new evaluation point with probability more than $\text{negl}(\lambda)$.

In other words, if $(pk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\mathbf{d}, k)$, $cm \leftarrow \text{Commit}(P, pk)$ and given k points $(\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}$ such that $k < d$, even if a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} has access to several batch openings proving those k evaluations, accepted by **Verify**, they cannot determine $P(\alpha)$ with probability more than $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ for all α that are not in the given set of evaluation points.

3 The Boomy protocol

3.1 Intuition

In [PST13], a prover wants to prove that a chosen polynomial $P \in \mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ evaluates to z at point $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_n)$. To do that, the authors based their protocol on the fact that the polynomial P can be divided by several quotients that nullify at this point \mathbf{a} . They proved that

$$\forall i \in [n], \exists Q_i \in \mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}], \exists r \in \mathbb{F} : P(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{i=1}^n Q_i(\mathbf{X}) \cdot (X_i - a_i) + r \quad (1)$$

This can be explained by observing that the polynomial reduction of a polynomial $P \in \mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ by the polynomial $(X_1 - a_1)$ leads to a remainder polynomial in $\mathbb{F}[X_2, \dots, X_n]$ and thus, that the successive reduction by all the polynomials $(X_i - a_i)$, for $i \in [n]$, leads to a constant remainder r which is equal to $P(\mathbf{a})$.

In the univariate case, to define batch openings of points $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_k)$, [KZG10] divides the polynomial P by $\prod_{i=1}^k (X - a_i)$ and shows that the remainder polynomial (of degree lower than k) is the Lagrange polynomial interpolation of the points $((a_1, P(a_1)), \dots, (a_k, P(a_k)))$. This polynomial can thus be rebuilt by the verifier from the given evaluation points.

To extend this scheme to the multivariate case, it is thus necessary to define some divisor polynomials built from the points $(\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_k)$ (with $\mathbf{a}_i = [a_{i,1}, \dots, a_{i,n}]$) that lead to a remainder polynomial that can be rebuilt by the verifier from the points and their evaluations.

To have a unique remainder, the natural extension of univariate polynomial division to the multivariate case is defined by the Gröbner bases theory [CLOS94]. The polynomials of the Gröbner basis then play the role of the divisor, the reduction operation corresponds to the polynomial pseudo-division and the corresponding affine algebraic variety is equal to the set composed of the common roots of the basis.

From the Gröbner basis theory, the underlying reason explaining why the construction of [PST13] works is that the polynomials $f_i(\mathbf{X}) := X_i - a_i$ define an affine algebraic variety which is exactly $\{\mathbf{a}\}$. Moreover, they also form the reduced Gröbner basis of the Ideal generated by (f_i) , since each of them is of degree 1 in a different variable and their leading coefficient is 1. The remainder of the reduction of P by (f_i) is then a constant polynomial always equal to $P(\mathbf{a})$.

To generalize their protocol over a batch of points $(\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}$, we reused the reason cited above to construct a set of polynomials that defines an affine algebraic variety that equals $\{\mathbf{a}_i : i \in [k]\}$. To make the remainder unique, we computed the reduced Gröbner basis \mathbf{B} of the ideal of the affine variety generated by this set of polynomials. This generalizes Eq. 1 as

$$P(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{i=1}^n Q_i(\mathbf{X}) \cdot B_i(\mathbf{X}) + R(\mathbf{X})$$

The verifier has to recover $R(\mathbf{X})$ from the evaluations points, which is not trivial with more than one point. To do that, we propose computing one possible interpolation of the batch of points. Since the reduction of P or of any other interpolation of the points $(\mathbf{a}_i, P(\mathbf{a}_i))_{i \in [k]}$ in $\mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}] / \langle \mathbf{B} \rangle$ is equal to R , the verifier only has to reduce their interpolated polynomial by the ideal $\langle \mathbf{B} \rangle$ to recover R .

3.2 Main Protocol

For a multivariate polynomial $P(\mathbf{X}) \in \mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ of degree at most d_i in variable X_i , a prover wants to convince a verifier, except with probability less than $negl(\lambda)$, that for a

chosen set of k points $(\mathbf{a}_i) \in (\mathbb{F}^n)^k$,

$$P(\mathbf{a}_i) = z_i \text{ for } i \in [k]$$

Below, we present the Boomy protocol composed of these four algorithms:

- **Setup**(\mathbf{d}, k): uniformly randomly choose $\tau \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}^n$. Output $pk := \{[\prod_{i=1}^n \tau_i^{\alpha_i}]_1 : \alpha_i \in [d_i]\}$ and $vk := \{[\prod_{i=1}^n \tau_i^{\alpha_i}]_1 : \alpha_i \in [k]\} \cup \{[\prod_{i=1}^n \tau_i^{\alpha_i}]_2 : \alpha_i \in [k]\}$.
- **Commit**(P, pk): return $cm := [P(\tau)]_1$.
- **Open**($P, k, (\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}, pk$):
 1. Compute the reduced Gröbner basis \mathbf{B} of the ideal of the affine algebraic variety composed of $(\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}$.
 2. Reduce the polynomial P with each B_i to recover the “quotients” Q_i and the “remainder” R such that

$$P(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} (B_i(\mathbf{X}) \cdot Q_i(\mathbf{X})) + R(\mathbf{X})$$

3. Compute and return the proof $\pi := ([Q_i(\tau)]_1)_{i \in [|\mathbf{B}|]}$ composed of each “quotient” evaluated in τ .
- **Verify**($k, (\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}, z, \pi, cm, vk$):
 1. Compute the reduced Gröbner basis \mathbf{B} of the ideal of the affine algebraic variety composed of $(\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}$.
 2. Compute by interpolation a polynomial $R'(\mathbf{X})$ such that $R'(\mathbf{a}_i) = z_i$ for any $i \in [k]$. Recover $R(\mathbf{X})$ by reducing $R'(\mathbf{X})$ with \mathbf{B} . Evaluate R and each B_i in τ to obtain $[R(\tau)]_1$ and $[B_i(\tau)]_2$.
 3. Accept if:

$$e(cm - [R(\tau)]_1, [1]_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} e(\pi_i, [B_i(\tau)]_2)$$

otherwise reject.

Theorem 1. *The Boomy protocol is a selectively secure multivariate polynomial commitment scheme (as defined in Section 2.4) under the assumptions presented in Section 2.3.*

A proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the next Section 3.3.

Note that since the reduced Gröbner basis is unique for a given ideal, its computation can be avoided by the verifier if provided by the prover or another entity. Then, the verifier still needs to verify that the proposed basis \mathbf{B} actually has all of its elements B_i in the ideal of the affine variety (ensuring that $B_i(\mathbf{a}_j) = 0$ for all $i \in [|\mathbf{B}|]$ and for all $j \in [k]$) and that it is a reduced Gröbner basis using Definitions 3 and 5 of Section 2.2.

3.3 Security Analysis

In this section, we prove that Boomy’s construction is secure under the selective security model and explain why its security can also be proven in the algebraic group model of [FKL18]. To prove the polynomial binding, the evaluation binding and the hiding properties, we will build a reduction \mathcal{S} that can break a given l-SBDH, l-DI or DL problem in PPT with probability more than $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ if it has access to an adversary \mathcal{A} that can break one of these properties in PPT with probability more than $\text{negl}(\lambda)$.

3.3.1 Correctness:

The correctness directly follows from the reduction of P by the reduced Gröbner basis \mathbf{B} giving quotients Q_i and remainder R .

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Accept} \leftarrow \text{Verify}() &\iff e(cm - [R(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1, [1]_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} e(\pi_i, [B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_2) \\
&\iff e([P(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1 - [R(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1, [1]_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} e([Q_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1, [B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_2) \\
&\iff [P(\boldsymbol{\tau}) - R(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_T = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} [B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \cdot Q_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_T \\
&\iff P(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \equiv \left(\sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \cdot Q_i(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \right) + R(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \pmod{\text{ord}(G_T)}
\end{aligned}$$

3.3.2 Polynomial Binding:

The reduction \mathcal{S} first crafts the trusted setup of Boomy using the elements $([1]_1, [t]_1, \dots, [t^l]_1)$ of the l-SDH problem. It can do this by uniformly randomly picking r_i and s_i in \mathbb{F} and fixing $\tau_i := r_i \cdot t + s_i$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$. Since each τ_i is a polynomial in t , \mathcal{S} can craft vk and pk without knowing t . This construction is indistinguishable from uniformly randomly picking τ_i as the distribution of $r_i \cdot t + s_i$ follows a uniform distribution. Indeed, when $r_i = 0$, τ_i is equal to s_i which was uniformly randomly picked. When $r_i \neq 0$, then $r_i \cdot t$ is also uniform because the multiplication by a fixed non-zero element in a finite field (here t) is a bijection. Adding s_i uniformly drawn does not change the distribution. Suppose that a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} can craft $P(\mathbf{X})$ and $Q(\mathbf{X})$ such that $P \neq Q$ and $[P(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1 = [Q(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1$, then we have:

$$[P(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1 - [Q(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1 = [P(\boldsymbol{\tau}) - Q(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1 = [(P - Q)(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1 = [0]_1$$

It follows that $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ is a non-trivial root of the polynomial $P - Q$. The simulator recovers the polynomials P and Q from \mathcal{A} and computes $P - Q$ which is a non-zero polynomial in $\mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$. \mathcal{S} crafts the polynomial $Z(X) := (P - Q)(\mathbf{X})$ by replacing each variable X_i with $r_i \cdot X + s_i$. According to Lemma 2.1 of [BFL20], since $P - Q$ is a non-zero multivariate polynomial in $\mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}]$ of a total degree d and that $Z(X) \in (F[r_1, \dots, r_n, s_1, \dots, s_n])[X]$ is define as $Z(X) = P(r_1 X + s_1, \dots, r_n X + s_n)$, then the coefficient of maximal degree of Z is a polynomial in $F[r_1, \dots, r_n]$ of degree d . Then Z is not the zero polynomial with overwhelming probability. Then, we have $Z(t) = (P - Q)(\boldsymbol{\tau}) = 0$. \mathcal{S} can recover t in PPT with a probability equal to that of \mathcal{A} minus a negligible quantity in λ by factorizing Z [VZGG13], breaking the l-DL assumption.

3.3.3 Evaluation Binding:

The reduction \mathcal{S} first asks the adversary \mathcal{A} to commit on the challenge point $(\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}$ at which it will forge a valid batch opening containing at least one incorrect evaluation. Suppose that the incorrect evaluation happens at least at \mathbf{a}_η with the false value z'_η for the rest of the proof. \mathcal{S} then crafts the trusted setup of Boomy using the elements $([1]_1, [t]_1, \dots, [t^l]_1)$ of the l-SBDH problem. It can do this by uniformly randomly picking r_i and s_i in \mathbb{F} that verify $a_{\eta,i} = r_i \cdot a_{\eta,1} + s_i$ and fixing $\tau_i := r_i \cdot t + s_i$ for $i \in [n] \setminus \{\eta\}$ and $\tau_\eta = t$. Since each τ_i is a polynomial in t , \mathcal{S} can craft vk and pk without knowing t . Once again, this trusted setup is indistinguishable from one generated with **Setup** because each τ_i

is uniformly randomly picked for the same reasons as above and because we supposed that t comes from the l-SBDH problem setup. \mathcal{S} then calls \mathcal{A} to recover $cm, \boldsymbol{\pi}, \boldsymbol{\pi}', \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{z}', (\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}$ in PPT with probability more than $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ such that both $\text{Verify}(k, (\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}, \mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\pi}, cm)$ and $\text{Verify}(k, (\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}, \mathbf{z}', \boldsymbol{\pi}', cm)$ output *Accept* and $\mathbf{z} \neq \mathbf{z}'$. We will use \mathbf{B} to denote the elements of the Gröbner basis used during the Boomy protocol, $R(\mathbf{X})$ and $R'(\mathbf{X})$ to denote the remainders of the reduction of the interpolated polynomial of (\mathbf{a}_i, z_i) and (\mathbf{a}_i, z'_i) by \mathbf{B} . Since the verification holds, we have

$$e(cm - [R(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1, [1]_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} e(\pi_i, [B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_2)$$

$$e(cm - [R'(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1, [1]_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} e(\pi'_i, [B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_2)$$

\mathcal{S} defines $\delta(\mathbf{X}) := R'(\mathbf{X}) - R(\mathbf{X}) \neq 0$ (because $R'(\mathbf{a}_\eta) - R(\mathbf{a}_\eta) = z'_\eta - z_\eta \neq 0$). It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} e(cm - [R(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1, [1]_2) - e(cm - [R'(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1, [1]_2) &= \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} (e(\pi_i, [B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_2) - e(\pi'_i, [B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_2)) \\ \iff e([R'(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1 - [R(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1, [1]_2) &= \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} e(\pi_i - \pi'_i, [B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_2) \quad (2) \\ \iff e([\delta(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1, [1]_2) &= \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} e(\pi_i - \pi'_i, [B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_2) \end{aligned}$$

But since $B_i \in \mathbf{I}(\mathbf{V}(\{\mathbf{a}_i, i \in [k]\})) \subseteq \mathbf{I}(\mathbf{V}(\{\mathbf{a}_\eta\}))$, $\forall i \in [|\mathbf{B}|], \forall j \in [n], \exists Q_{i,j}(\mathbf{X}) \in \mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ such that $B_i(\mathbf{X}) := \sum_{j=1}^n (X_j - a_{\eta,j}) \cdot Q_{i,j}(\mathbf{X})$, \mathcal{S} can do the same with $\delta(\mathbf{X})$ but $\delta \notin \mathbf{I}(\mathbf{V}(\{\mathbf{a}_\eta\}))$ so that δ will have a remainder different from the zero polynomial. Since the quotients are all degree 1 in each variable, the remainder will be in \mathbb{F} . So, $\forall j \in [n], \exists D_j(\mathbf{X}) \in \mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}]$ such that $\delta(\mathbf{X}) := \sum_{j=1}^n (X_j - a_{\eta,j}) \cdot D_j(\mathbf{X}) + d$. With $d \in \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}$. Eq. 2 can be rewritten, replacing π and π' by $[p]_1$ and $[p']_1$ respectively, as

$$\begin{aligned} \left[\sum_{j=1}^n (\tau_j - a_{\eta,j}) \cdot D_j(\boldsymbol{\tau}) + d \right]_T &= \left[\sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} (p_i - p'_i) \cdot \sum_{j=1}^n (\tau_j - a_{\eta,j}) \cdot Q_{i,j}(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \right]_T \\ \iff [d]_T &= \left[\sum_{j=1}^n (\tau_j - a_{\eta,j}) \cdot \left(-D_j(\boldsymbol{\tau}) + \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} (p_i - p'_i) \cdot Q_{i,j}(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \right) \right]_T \\ \iff [d]_T &= \left[(t - a_{\eta,1}) \cdot \sum_{j=1}^n r_j \cdot \left(-D_j(\boldsymbol{\tau}) + \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} (p_i - p'_i) \cdot Q_{i,j}(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \right) \right]_T \quad (3) \\ \iff \left[\frac{1}{t - a_{\eta,1}} \right]_T &= \left[d^{-1} \cdot \sum_{j=1}^n r_j \cdot \left(-D_j(\boldsymbol{\tau}) + \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} (p_i - p'_i) \cdot Q_{i,j}(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \right) \right]_T \\ \iff \left[\frac{1}{t - a_{\eta,1}} \right]_T &= d^{-1} \cdot \sum_{j=1}^n r_j \cdot \left(e([-D_j(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_1, [1]_2) + \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} e(\pi_i - \pi'_i, [Q_{i,j}(\boldsymbol{\tau})]_2) \right) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, \mathcal{S} can break the l-SBDH problem returning $(-a_{\eta,1}, \left[\frac{1}{t - a_{\eta,1}} \right]_T)$ in PPT using Eq. 3 with the same probability as \mathcal{A} .

Note that contrary to Section 3.3.2, the adversary \mathcal{A} can derive information from the fact that $a_{\eta,i}$ is derived using the same value r_i and s_i than τ_i . Moreover, the embedding degree of t and $a_{\eta,1}$ is known to the adversary which could potentially reveal information. However, even if the adversary's solution has been influenced, as long as they provide the correct information $cm, \pi, \pi', z, z', (\mathbf{a}_i)_{i \in [k]}$ that meet the required conditions, the simulator \mathcal{S} can still break the t-SBDH problem.

3.3.4 Computational Hiding:

The reduction \mathcal{S} can solve the discrete logarithm (DL) problem $([1]_1, [\alpha]_1)$ by interacting with an adversary \mathcal{A} capable of breaking the computational hiding property. To achieve this, \mathcal{S} first generates the trusted setup of the Boomy protocol by selecting $\tau \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}^n$ uniformly at random to obtain the verification key vk and the proving key pk . Next, \mathcal{S} chooses k evaluations $(\mathbf{a}_i, z_i)_{i \in [k]}$ of a polynomial P such that for all $j > 1$, $a_{i,j} = 0$, focusing on the first variable X_1 . The key assumption is that $P(\mathbf{0}) = \alpha$, where α is the solution to the DL problem. P is then a polynomial of degree at most k . Note that the polynomial P cannot be computed directly by the simulator \mathcal{S} without knowledge of α but using Lagrange interpolation over the X_1 variable, \mathcal{S} can construct the commitment of P from $[z_i]_{i \in [k]}$ and $[\alpha]_1$. At this point, \mathcal{S} uses the fact that $P(\mathbf{X})$ is only involving X_1 to compute one proof for each \mathbf{a}_i individually (so each batch contains one element). In this case, the Gröbner basis of proof associated to the point \mathbf{a}_i is exactly the polynomials $X_j - a_{i,j}$. Since P is only involving X_1 and that $j > 1$, $a_{i,j} = 0$, the simulator can compute easily the proof for each point. The simulator then generates $P'(\mathbf{X})$ as the Lagrange interpolation over the X_1 variable. This polynomial is computable and verifies $P(\mathbf{X}) = P'(\mathbf{X})(X_1 - \alpha)$. For each point \mathbf{a}_i , the proof is then

$$\begin{aligned} \left[\frac{P(\tau) - P(\mathbf{a}_i)}{\tau_1 - a_{i,1}} \right]_1 &= \left[\frac{P(\tau_1) - P(a_{i,1})}{\tau_1 - a_{i,0}} \right]_1 = \left[\frac{P(\tau_1)}{\tau_1 - a_{i,0}} \right]_1 - \left[\frac{P(a_{i,1})}{\tau_1 - a_{i,0}} \right]_1 \\ &= [P'(\tau_1)]_1 - [P'(a_{i,1})]_1 = [P'(\tau_1)]_1 - [z_i]_1 \end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{S} provides the necessary proofs and the commitment of P to the adversary \mathcal{A} . With non-negligible probability, \mathcal{A} outputs the polynomial P in polynomial time. Finally, \mathcal{S} recovers α by evaluating P at $\mathbf{0}$, thus solving the DL problem with non-negligible probability in polynomial time." This version makes the construction of the polynomial P clearer by breaking down the steps of Lagrange interpolation and the role of the KZG commitment more explicitly.

3.3.5 Note on the Algebraic Group Model

Note that these proofs can be done in the Algebraic Group Model (AGM) presented in [FKL18] through the proof of the knowledge soundness property and the "real pairing check" described in [GWC19]. Instead, the adversary \mathcal{A} in this model for our protocol is an algebraic adversary if it's a PPT algorithm under Boomy's trusted setup (pk, vk) and if for $i \in 1, 2$, whenever \mathcal{A} outputs an element of $e \in \mathbb{G}_i$, it also outputs a vector v such that $e = \langle v, pk_i \rangle$. The correctness, the polynomial binding and the hiding properties have the same proof in this model under the same assumptions. The evaluation binding holds if the knowledge soundness also holds. Indeed, since Verify outputted *Accept* for the evaluation of a polynomial P at (\mathbf{a}_i) to false values \mathbf{z}' represented by the polynomial $R'(\mathbf{X})$ (the remainder of the reduction), the adversary in the AGM can produce polynomials $Q_i(\mathbf{X})$ such that

$$e([P(\tau)]_1 - [R'(\tau)]_1, [1]_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} e([Q_i(\tau)]_1, [B_i(\tau)]_2)$$

Then the probability of success of this "real pairing" verification is bounded by the probability of success of the ideal check: $P(\mathbf{X}) - R'(\mathbf{X}) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} Q_i(\mathbf{X}) \cdot B_i(\mathbf{X})$. But since z' is not the real value of P on (\mathbf{a}_i) , we have $P(\mathbf{a}_i) - z'_i \neq 0$ for at least one $i \in [k]$. This means that $P(\mathbf{X}) - R'(\mathbf{X}) \notin \langle \mathbf{B} \rangle$ (the ideal of the affine algebraic variety of the points) which implies that $\nexists Q_i \in \mathbb{F}[\mathbf{X}]$, such that $P(\mathbf{X}) - R'(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{B}|} Q_i(\mathbf{X}) \cdot B_i(\mathbf{X})$, which contradicts the ideal check. This proves that the knowledge soundness holds and then that the Boomy protocol is secure in the AGM.

3.4 Complexity Analysis

In this section, we analyze the complexity of Boomy. In the case where $n = 1$, it is clear that our scheme is equivalent to [KZG10] and in the case where $n \geq 1$ and $k = 1$, it is equivalent to [PST13]. In those cases, we then have the same complexity as in the equivalent scheme.

In the following, we show the complexity evaluations of Boomy for a polynomial P of bounded degree d_i in each variable X_i . $d := \prod_{i \in [n]} d_i$ is the maximum number of terms in P . k denotes the maximum number of points supported during the Open algorithm.

The prover key pk is composed of elements enabling the commitment and proof of polynomials of maximum degrees d_i in variable X_i . Hence, its size is d elements of \mathbb{G}_1 . The verifier key, however, enables the verification of proofs produced with pk . It results that vk has to support the computation of the evaluation of the Gröbner basis and of the polynomial that is interpolating the remainder. Since all those polynomials are at most of degree k in each variable in accordance with Definition 3 of Section 2.2, vk is composed of k^n elements of \mathbb{G}_1 for the evaluation of the remainder and k^n elements of \mathbb{G}_2 for the evaluation of the polynomials of the Gröbner basis.

The proof is composed of the evaluations of the Gröbner basis \mathbf{B} and is thus of size $|\mathbf{B}|$ elements of \mathbb{G}_1 while the commitment is the evaluation of P which is only one element of \mathbb{G}_1 .

The computation complexity of the commitment is reduced to the evaluation of P in \mathbb{G}_1 . Since P is composed of at most d terms, it is necessary to do at most d scalar multiplications in \mathbb{G}_1 and $d - 1$ additions in \mathbb{G}_1 .

The opening is composed of several steps:

- The computation of the reduced Gröbner basis of the ideal of the affine algebraic variety. This can be done in $\mathcal{O}(nk^3)$ multiplications in \mathbb{F} using algorithms evoked in [FG06].
- The reduction of P by the Gröbner basis. It can be bounded by $\mathcal{O}(|\mathbf{B}| \cdot d \log d \log \|P\|)$ multiplications in \mathbb{F} with $\|P\|$ being the product of the maximum coefficients of P in each variable [VDH17].
- The evaluation of the quotients using pk . Since the quotients are of degree bounded by the degree of P , they require fewer than $|\mathbf{B}| \cdot d$ scalar multiplications in \mathbb{G}_1 and fewer than $|\mathbf{B}|(d - 1)$ additions in \mathbb{G}_1 .

The verification is composed of the following steps:

- The computation of the reduced Gröbner basis of the ideal of the affine algebraic variety. This can be done in $\mathcal{O}(nk^3)$ multiplications in \mathbb{F} using algorithms evoked in [FG06].
- One interpolation of the remainder using the evaluation points. This can be done in $\mathcal{O}(nk \log k)$ multiplications in \mathbb{F} .

- The reduction of the computed remainder by the Gröbner basis. This can be bounded by $\mathcal{O}(|\mathbf{B}| \cdot d \log d \log ||R||)$ multiplications in \mathbb{F} with $||R||$ being the product of the maximum coefficients of the remainder in each variable.
- The evaluation of the remainder using vk . This can be done in fewer than k^n scalar multiplications in \mathbb{G}_1 and fewer than $k^n - 1$ additions in \mathbb{G}_1 because the remainder is of degree bounded by k in each variable.
- The evaluation of the polynomials of the Gröbner basis using vk . This can be done in fewer than $|\mathbf{B}| \cdot k^n$ scalar multiplications in \mathbb{G}_2 and fewer than $|\mathbf{B}| \cdot (k^n - 1)$ additions in \mathbb{G}_2 .
- The $|\mathbf{B}|+1$ evaluation of the pairing function.

The complexity of Boomy is summarized in Table 3 below where, in the lines commit computation, opening computation and verification computation, \mathbb{G}_i^+ and \mathbb{G}_i^\times denote addition and scalar multiplication (in additive notation) in \mathbb{G}_i , and \mathbb{F}^\times denotes multiplications in \mathbb{F} . We denote the complexity of the pairing operation with \mathcal{P} .

Table 3: Complexity of Boomy in the general case

	Complexities
pk size	$d\mathbb{G}_1$
vk size	$(k^n)\mathbb{G}_1, (k^n)\mathbb{G}_2$
proof size	$ \mathbf{B} \mathbb{G}_1$
commit size	$1\mathbb{G}_1$
commit computation	$(d-1)\mathbb{G}_1^+, d\mathbb{G}_1^\times$
opening computation	$\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} d \log d \log P + nk^3)\mathbb{F}^\times,$ $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} \cdot d)\mathbb{G}_1^+, \mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} \cdot d)\mathbb{G}_1^\times$
verification computation	$\mathcal{O}(nk \log k + \mathbf{B} d \log d \log R + nk^3)\mathbb{F}^\times,$ $\mathcal{O}(k^n)\mathbb{G}_1^+, \mathcal{O}(k^n)\mathbb{G}_1^\times, \mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} \cdot k^n)\mathbb{G}_2^+,$ $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{B} \cdot k^n)\mathbb{G}_2^\times, (\mathbf{B} +1)\mathcal{P}$

Note that trusted setups of univariate polynomial commitments can be computed using a multi-party protocol, reinforcing their security by distributing the knowledge of the secret among multiple entities. An adversary would have to corrupt every participant to recover the secret τ of the trusted setup [KMSV21]. Moreover, univariate polynomial commitments setups can be adapted and reused without a loss of security for the Boomy protocol, as proposed for [PST13] by the authors of [ZBK⁺22]. This directly enables the use of trusted setups generated from multi-party protocols without the need to redo the heavy computation associated.

It is also important to see that the verifier can ask the prover for the reduced Gröbner basis directly. In this case, the verifier still needs to verify the basis provided using the Buchberger criterion [Buc76] or Definition 3. This does not improve the asymptotic complexity but it may be more efficient in practice.

4 Special Cases

4.1 Cartesian Product

First, recall that a Cartesian Product of n set $S_i, i \in [n]$ is defined by the set $\{(a_1, \dots, a_n) \mid \forall i \in [n], a_i \in S_i\}$. Then, when the points (\mathbf{a}) of the affine algebraic variety form a Cartesian product the computation of the reduced Gröbner basis is nearly free: it is the n univariate polynomials that vanish on the corresponding dimension on each point. For example, the evaluation of the i^{th} polynomial would be 0 on the i^{th} coordinate of each point in the Cartesian product. More precisely, if we suppose that we want to construct the polynomials defining $\mathbf{V} := \{\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathbb{F}^n : i \in [k]\}$, we must first calculate the n polynomials that define the n algebraic affine varieties in each dimension independently: $\forall i \in [n], S_i := \{a_{j,i}; \forall j \in [k]\}$ and $f_i(X_i) := \prod_{a_{j,i} \in S_i} (X_i - a_{j,i})$. Those polynomials together define the affine algebraic variety of the Cartesian product formed by each tuple that has each coordinate in common with any \mathbf{a}_i .

Theorem 2. *The polynomials $f_i(X_i) := \prod_{a_{j,i} \in S_i} (X_i - a_{j,i})$ such that $\forall i \in [n], S_i := \{a_{j,i}; \forall j \in [k]\}$, form the reduced Gröbner basis of the ideal of $\mathbf{V} := \{\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathbb{F}^n : i \in [k]\}$.*

Proof. Firstly, it is easy to see that for all $i \in [n], f_i \in I(\mathbf{V})$ since each f_i vanishes on all points by construction. (f_1, \dots, f_n) form a Gröbner basis based on Definition 3 of Section 2.2. If the points form a Cartesian product with γ_i different coordinate in dimension i , then $|\mathbf{V}| = \prod_{i=1}^n \gamma_i$ and $\deg(f_i) = \gamma_i$. Since each f_i is of degree γ_i in variable X_i and is univariate, we have exactly $\prod_{i=1}^n \gamma_i$ different monomials that are not divisible by every $LT(f_i) = X_i^{\gamma_i}$. Then, (f_1, \dots, f_n) is a Gröbner basis of $I(\mathbf{V})$. It is also the reduced one since we directly see that their leading coefficient is 1 and that the monomials of f_i which only contains X_i are not reducible by the others that do not contain X_i . \square

By forming the Cartesian product of sets of points, we can define polynomials that vanish on these points, enabling efficient verification of evaluations at multiple points simultaneously efficiently because the number of elements in the Gröbner basis is exactly the number of sets defining the Cartesian product.

4.2 Points Distinct in One Dimension

In the case where, for a given dimension m , all of the m -coordinates of the evaluation points are different, the proof can be reduced to n elements. The computation of the reduced Gröbner basis can also be simplified because it can be obtained by only computing Lagrange polynomial interpolations in one dimension. This case may occur in many applications enabling drastic reductions in verifier and prover computations.

Theorem 3. *For any dimension n , for any set of points $\{\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathbb{F}^n : i \in [k]\}$ such that $\exists m \in [n] : \forall (i, j)$ with $i \neq j$ we have $a_{i,m} \neq a_{j,m}$, we can build the reduced Gröbner basis of the ideal of the variety $\{\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathbb{F}^n : i \in [k]\}$ only using Lagrange polynomial interpolations.*

Proof. Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$, fix $\mathbf{V} := \{\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathbb{F}^n : i \in [k]\}$ such that $\exists m \in [n] : \forall (i, j), i \neq j \Rightarrow a_{i,m} \neq a_{j,m}$. Let $\mathbf{I}(\mathbf{V})$ denote the ideal of the polynomials vanishing at the points of \mathbf{V} . As [CLOS94] did with two variables, using Lagrange polynomial interpolations, we compute the $n - 1$ intermediate polynomials $h_i(X_m)$ for each $i \neq m$:

$$h_i(X_m) := \sum_{u=1}^k a_{u,i} \prod_{v \neq u} \frac{X_m - a_{v,m}}{a_{u,m} - a_{v,m}}$$

$$\text{Let } f(X_m) := \prod_{i=1}^k (X_m - a_{i,m}).$$

First, let us show that:

$$\mathbf{I}(\mathbf{V}) = \langle X_0 - h_0(X_m), X_1 - h_1(X_m), \dots, X_{m-1} - h_{m-1}(X_m), \\ f(X_m), X_{m+1} - h_{m+1}(X_m), \dots, X_n - h_n(X_m) \rangle$$

1. It is straightforward to prove the inclusion $\langle X_0 - h_0(X_m), X_1 - h_1(X_m), \dots, X_{m-1} - h_{m-1}(X_m), f(X_m), X_{m+1} - h_{m+1}(X_m), \dots, X_n - h_n(X_m) \rangle \subseteq \mathbf{I}(\mathbf{V})$. Indeed, $f(X_m)$ vanishes by construction at $\{a_{i,m} : i \in [k]\}$. This is also the case for any $X_i - h_i(X_m)$ at $\{a_{j,i} : j \in [k]\}$ because $\forall j \in [k], h_i(a_{j,m}) = a_{j,i}$.
2. Using the monomial ordering $X_1 > \dots > X_{m-1} > X_{m+1} > \dots > X_n > X_m$, the leading term of $X_i - h_i(X_m)$ is X_i for all $i \neq m$ and the leading term of $f(X_m)$ is X_m^k . It follows that the cardinality of the set of monomials not divisible by the leading term of those polynomials is k . Using Definition 3 of Section 2.2, $\mathbf{B} := \{X_i - h_i(X_m) : i \in [k] \setminus \{m\}\} \cup \{f(X_m)\}$ is a Gröbner basis of $\mathbf{I}(\mathbf{V})$.
3. Once again, each element's leading coefficient is 1 by construction. The monomials of $f(X_m)$ are powers of X_m making them not divisible by any polynomial in the ideal of the other variables generated by the leading terms of $X_i - h_i(X_m)$ for all $i \neq m$. The monomials of $X_i - h_i(X_m)$ can be powers strictly lesser than k of X_m or X_i , they can therefore not be divided by any polynomial of $\langle X_0, \dots, X_{i-1}, X_{i+1}, \dots, X_n, X_m^k \rangle$. It follows that the Gröbner basis is also the reduced Gröbner basis.

□

Corollary 1. *The remainder of any $P \in \mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ by the reduction of \mathbf{B} is a polynomial in one variable.*

Proof. This proposition is trivial since in the previous construction, the leading terms of the polynomials of the Gröbner basis \mathbf{B} are X_i when $i \neq m$ and X_m^k , therefore the remainder is composed of the monomials $1, X_m, \dots, X_m^{k-1}$. □

It follows that the remainder $R(\mathbf{X})$ can be directly computed once again using a Lagrange polynomial interpolation in variable X_m . In this case, the interpolated polynomial is already the remainder of its reduction by \mathbf{B} making this step of computation unnecessary and the verifier key vk reducible to only k elements. The complexity is summarized in Table 4 below.

5 Applications

5.1 Verifiable Computation

Verifiable computations are being used more and more in several fields, such as cloud computing to ensure the correct behavior of an external server [YYV17], or blockchain to improve scalability [TSH22]. Verifiable computation is the main area of application of [PST13], as far as we know. This is a very special case of multivariate polynomial commitment, as the programs that are verified are often represented as a series of univariate quadratic polynomials [GWC19]. It can therefore also be represented as a bivariate polynomial where the degree of one of its two variables is at most two [CBBZ23]. We believe that Boomy can be applied to these techniques to build proofs of several evaluation points at the same time, enabling new ways to make proof aggregations, accelerating their protocols, reducing their communication complexity, or opening new gate customization possibilities.

Table 4: Complexity of Boomy when the evaluation points form a Cartesian product or when they are distinct on at least one dimension.

	Complexities
pk size	$d\mathbb{G}_1$
vk size	$k\mathbb{G}_1, (k+n)\mathbb{G}_2$
proof size	$n\mathbb{G}_1$
commit size	$1\mathbb{G}_1$
commit computation	$(d-1)\mathbb{G}_1^+, d\mathbb{G}_1^\times$
opening computation	$\mathcal{O}(nk \log k + nd \log d \log \ P\)\mathbb{F}^\times,$ $\mathcal{O}(nd)\mathbb{G}_1^+, \mathcal{O}(nd)\mathbb{G}_1^\times$
verification computation	$\mathcal{O}(nk \log k)\mathbb{F}^\times, k\mathbb{G}_1^+$ $(k+1)\mathbb{G}_1^\times, \mathcal{O}(nk)\mathbb{G}_2^+,$ $\mathcal{O}(nk)\mathbb{G}_2^\times, (n+1)\mathcal{P}$

5.2 Data Availability Sampling

One of the main challenges in blockchain is the scalability issue. To address this issue, [ASBK21] proposes making light clients able to verify the availability and authenticity of block data. They based their approach on the proof of erasure codes, more exactly, on two-dimensional (or more) Reed-Solomon codes to make data availability sampling [HASW25]. Later, the Ethereum blockchain planned to make this protocol a core component of their sharding protocol and create a new transaction metadata type called blobs [But22] based on polynomial commitments. However, they switched their paradigm from the fraud proofs of [ASBK21] to validity proofs, i.e., using polynomial commitments. The proto-Danksharding upgrade of the blockchain is based on the commitment protocol in [KZG10] enabling each line to be committed as a univariate polynomial. The two-dimensional encoded data can then be verified in batches of 16 evaluations of the same row called samples, deriving the commitments of the extended lines using the homomorphic properties of the [KZG10] polynomial commitment. Each validator of the blockchain, that acts as the light clients described in [ASBK21], will then have to verify two rows and two columns of encoded data as shown in Figure 2.

We claim that their scheme can benefit from Boomy in that it would reduce the size of communications, one of the new challenges that have emerged following Ethereum's sharding proposal.

Indeed, by considering the block of data as one single bivariate polynomial, Boomy reduces the size of the commitment to only one element instead of 256 per block. This improves the main blockchain storage from 256 blob commitments per shard to only one per shard. Concretely, Boomy would reduce the total commit size stored definitively on the blockchain from 512 kB to 2 kB for each Ethereum slot (every 12 seconds). It is fully backward compatible because it is also possible to verify that Boomy's unique commitment is linked to [KZG10]'s commitment of a specific blob using two pairings. Indeed, denoting P_i the univariate polynomial in variable Y of the blob on the i^{th} row, its [KZG10] commitment cm_i , and supposing that we evaluate the bivariate polynomial over natural integers in $\mathbb{Z}/256\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/4096\mathbb{Z}$, ordered lexicographically, we then have the following:




Figure 2: Ethereum's Danksharding.

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(X, Y) &= Q_i(X, Y)(X - i) + P_i(Y) \\
 \iff P(\tau_1, \tau_2) &= Q_i(\tau_1, \tau_2)(\tau_1 - i) + P_i(\tau_2) \\
 \iff P(\tau_1, \tau_2) \cdot G_T - P_i(\tau_2) \cdot G_T &= Q_i(\tau_1, \tau_2)(\tau_1 - i) \cdot G_T \\
 \iff e(cm - cm_i, [1]_2) &= e([Q_i(\tau_1, \tau_2)]_1, [\tau_1]_2 - [i]_2)
 \end{aligned}$$

Using this property, Boomy is fully backward compatible with the current Ethereum protocol. Using the correct monomial ordering and the Cartesian special case, the Boomy's proof of one sample would be composed firstly (the first quotient polynomial) of the [KZG10]'s polynomial commitment for the same blob's row and secondly of the same proof (the second quotient polynomial) as the proof of the [KZG10] protocol.

Boomy's trusted setup would need to be bigger but still largely acceptable (roughly the size of only one non-encoded block of blobs).

Actually, a sample enables the verification of a part of a given blob and does not integrate elements from different blobs of the block. Seeing the block as a bivariate polynomial, Boomy also opens new possibilities on the distribution of the elements of the samples. It is also possible to have different sample distributions among the validators as in the manner described in [BN23]. This enables a more flexible approach for a better distribution of the data in the network reducing the number of required online validators to reconstruct the data from shards, improving the overall security [BN23], and cutting down communication complexity, tackling the major network challenges posed by sharding [KAR⁺23].

Note that Boomy could have the same benefits for Verifiable information dispersal (VID) [Rab89, CT05] systems, rather similar to data availability sampling, which encode the data to ensure a secure and valid distribution among peers.

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, the Boomy protocol presents a notable advancement in the field of polynomial commitment schemes. By extending the capabilities of existing protocols to multivariate polynomials and batch openings, Boomy addresses some of the limitations of univariate schemes and could contribute to the efficiency of various protocols.

One of the most promising applications of Boomy is in data availability sampling, where it can significantly enhance the scalability and security of blockchain technologies. By enabling efficient verification of multiple data points simultaneously, Boomy reduces communication complexity and improves the overall performance of data availability checks. This makes it a valuable tool for ensuring the integrity and availability of data in decentralized systems.

While Boomy shows potential, further research and real-world testing are necessary to fully understand its strengths and limitations. Its integration with SNARKs and other zero-knowledge proof systems suggests that it could play a role in enhancing efficiency in blockchain technologies and verifiable computations. Future work may explore optimizations and extensions of the Boomy protocol to address emerging challenges in the field of cryptography.

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